

Physical To Cyber – And Back

Fingerprint Scanner Security

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Dual headquarters in Switzerland and Singapore


Read.Me

- Been in infosec since IRIX exploits
- Switched sides between infosec and IT operations multiple times
- Responded to Fortune 100 site breach, plant production halted due to SQL Slammer, one of the world's first 100 Gbps DDoS attacks
- Now mostly do PowerPoint
- I scanned a network once, which led to this discovery






There was a net





There was a net





Initial discovery

:

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	Network Configuration						
	Machine Name						
Network Setting	Machine Name						
Other Setting	Data Transmission Port						
Firmware Update Account Setting	Port Number	2167	(from 1025 to 65535, require a r	(boot)			
Account setting	DHCP Climit						
	C Enable O Disable						
	IP Address Subnet Mask Default Gateway Domain Name Server Domain Name Service	288 288 288 0					
	Disable Enable DDNS Host Name User Name Password Status:						
	Submit Cancel						



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Firmware update

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	Firmware Update			
Network Setting Other Setting Firmware Update Account Setting	Firmware Update After pressing the Update button, please wait while the update request is being processed. After update is completed, the device will reboot automatically. You can re-login afterwards. Select Firmware: Browse No file selected. Upland			
	Update State:			



Downloading firmware

root@kali:~	# binwalk downloa	ads/ .bin
DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
382053	0x5D465	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 5452
641421	0x9C98D	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 5376
879245	0xD6A8D	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 1424
880857	0xD70D9	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 1400
910577	0xDE4F1	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 5564
919061	0xE0615	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 1452
919101	0xE063D	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 1448
919141	0xE0665	Certificate in DER format (x509 v3), header length: 4, sequence length: 1472
1123608	0x112518	Unix path: /home/zh/tmp/ release/trunk/kernel/linux-2.4.x/include/linux/nfs page.h
1124652	0x11292C	Unix path: /home/zh/tmp/ release/trunk/kernel/linux-2.4.x/include/linux/nfs_page.h
1125184	0x112B40	Unix path: /home/zh/tmp/
1146768	0x117F90	CRC32 polynomial table, little endian
1154799	0x119EEF	Copyright string: "copyright 1998,1999 D. Jeff Dionne"
1154841	0x119F19	Copyright string: "copyright 1998 Kenneth Albanowski"
1255665	0x1328F1	Minix filesystem, V1, little endian, O zones
1257160	0x132EC8	romfs filesystem, version 1 size: 1560448 bytes, named "



Extract romfs and read files

root@kali:~# dd if= .bin of=romfs.bin
skip=1257160 bs=1
1560576+0 records in
1560576+0 records out
1560576 bytes (1.6 MB, 1.5 MiB) copied, 2.20844 s, 707 kB/s
root@kali:~# mount -o loop romfs.bin /mnt
root@kali:~# ls /mnt
bin dev etc nfs proc root swap usb usr var
root@kali:~#



passwd?..

root@kali:~# cat /mnt/etc/passwd root:ps7Rjb6rgzHbs:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown ftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin nobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin nfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin desktop:x:80:80:desktop:/var/lib/menu/kde:/sbin/nologin :x:500:500::/home/ :/bin/bash



passwd!

root@kali:~# john --show passwd root:nuc745gf:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh

1 password hash cracked, 0 left



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```
root@kali:~# 1s -1 /mnt/etc
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 32 Jan 1 1970 config
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 32 Jan 1 1970 ConfigPage
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 32 Jan 1 1970 dropbear
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 10 Jan 1 1970 group
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 130 Jan 1 1970 inetd.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 340 Jan 1 1970 inittab
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 399 Jan 1 1970 passwd
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1571 Jan 1 1970 protocols
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 247 Jan 1 1970 rc
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 19 Jan 1 1970 resolv.conf -> ../swap/resolv.conf
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 11247 Jan 1 1970 services
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 843 Jan 1 1970 ssl cert.pem
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 891 Jan 1 1970 ssl key.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 651 Jan 1 1970 ssl req.csr
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1960 Jan 1
                                  1970 WRConfig.ini
root@kali:~# ls -l /mnt/etc/dropbear/
total 0
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 427 Jan 1 1970 dropbear rsa host key
root@kali:~#
```



root@kali:~# cat /mnt/etc/inittab

- ::sysinit:/etc/rc
- ::respawn:-/bin/sh
- ::wait:/usr/bin/manufacture
- ::respawn:/bin/syslogd
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/dnsap
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/port80
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/httpd
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/LineDns
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/ipr
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/DVRSearch
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/serverPNP
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/watchdog
- ::respawn:/usr/bin/controller_broadcast
- root@kali:~#



```
root@kali:~# cat /mnt/etc/rc
#!/bin/sh
mount -t proc none /proc
mount -o remount,rw /dev/root /
mount -t ramfs none /swap
mount -t jffs2 /dev/mtdblock1 /etc/config
mkdir /swap/log
touch /swap/devlog
ifconfig eth0 192.168.0.10 netmask 255.255.248.0
ifconfiq lo up
inetd &
sh &
root@kali:~#
```



root@kali:~# cat /mnt/etc/inetd.conf

#telnet stream tcp nowait root
#ftp stream tcp nowait
#ftpdata stream tcp nowait root
root@kali:~#

/bin/telnetd root /bin/ftpd /bin/ftpd



Looking at binaries

root@kali:~# file /mnt/usr/bin/*

/mnt/usr/bin/0: /mnt/usr/bin/1: /mnt/usr/bin/dnsap: /mnt/usr/bin/dropbear: /mnt/usr/bin/DVRSearch: /mnt/usr/bin/httpd: /mnt/usr/bin/ipr: /mnt/usr/bin/LineDns: /mnt/usr/bin/manufacture: /mnt/usr/bin/nbnsd: /mnt/usr/bin/port80: /mnt/usr/bin/serverPNP:

symbolic link to syslog switch symbolic link to syslog switch /mnt/usr/bin/controller broadcast: BFLT executable - version 4 ram gzip BFLT executable - version 4 ram gzip BFLT executable - version 4 ram BFLT executable - version 4 ram gzip BFLT executable - version 4 ram gzip

bFLT

Each flat binary is preceded by a header of the structure shown below in listing 1. It starts with 4 ASCII bytes, "bFLT" or 0x62, 0x46, 0x4C, 0x54 which identifies the binary as conforming to the flat format. The next field designates the version number of the flat header. As mentioned there are two major versions, version 2 and version 4. Each version differs by the supported flags and the format of the relocations.

The next group of fields in the header specify the starting address of each segment relative to the start of the flat file. Most files start the .text segment at 0x40 (immediately after the end of the header). The data_start, data_end and bss_end fields specify the start or finish of the designated segments. With the absence of text_end and bss_start fields, it is assumed that the text segment comes first, followed immediately by the data segment. While the comments for the flat file header would suggest there is a bss segment somewhere in the flat file, this is not true. bss_end is used to represent the length of the bss segment, thus should be set to data_end + size of bss.




Figure 1 : Flat File Format





Boa web server (<u>http://www.boa.org/</u>). From Boa site:

Boa currently seems to be the favorite web server in the embedded crowd, and embedded Linux, despite all the marketing hype, really is a big deal. Supposedly, an older version of Boa, v0.92q, runs in 32K address space on m68k, like used in uCLinux. See <u>http://www.uclinux.org/</u>

Last updated 23 February 2005!



httpd

Functions window		□ # ×		IDA View-A		Pseudocode-8	8	50	Strings window			Hex View-1	
Function name	Segment .text	Stu ^	1 2	Int Register		<pre>tions() '*/Curtime.htm</pre>		r aur e	T CALLBACK	IC UND C		83.	
7 sub_1938	text	001				*/Hetwork.hts							
7 sub_1850	test.	00x	• 5			onfigNetwork",							b:
7 sub_1E94	text	004	. 6			*/Other.htm"							-
sub_1FFC	.text	00	• 7			onfigOther", (1
sub_2134	.text	001	• 8			"*/Pass.htm",							
sub_22E4	.text	00×	• 9			onFigPass", (
sub_23AC	text.	00×	 18 11 			"#/FHUpProcess onFigReboot",							
sub_2518	.text	00X	• 12			"HUpload.cgi",							
sub_26C4	.text	00×	• 13			*/ASFunc.htm							1
sub_2758	.text	001	• 14	RegisterE	nbedFun("Co	onfighSFunc",	CREQU	EST C	ALLBACK PFUN	()sub	2264.	(void =)-1)	:
sub_27F4	.text	001	• 15	j_Registe	"EnbedFun("	*/ASSet.htm",	(REQ	UEST_	CALLBACK_PFI	IN) sub	718,	0);	
sub_2A94	.text	001	• 16			onfighSSet", (ŀ
sub_2804	.text	001	• 17			"#/Tine.htn",							
sub_2CSC	.text	00	1819			onfigTime", (
sub_2064	.text	001	28			"*/Extend.htm onFigExtend".							
sub_2DDC	text.	00×	21			*/Hidden.htm							
RegisterEmbedFuncti	.text	00	• 22			onfigHidden",							:
sub_3268	.text	00X	• 23	RegisterE	nbedFun("*,	CardData.htm	. (RE	QUEST	_CALLBACK_PF	UN)su	0_46E4	. (void =)-	1
Start_12_sub_3294	.text	00	24	//									
5ub_3488	.text	00	25		ering the i	Function to be	ing u	p ssh	d				
/ sub_34C0	text.	00×	26	//	Booisterfel	edfun("*/isst		- 10	CONFET PALL	ACK P	CHM/A Bar	dia22 alloc i	
f sub_3518	.text	00X	27		registertin	sear and -11221			edacoi eurri	mun_P	onyer.	rudobseno.	-



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httpd

```
A
                                                                                                     E
       Pseudocode-8
                          - 060
                                 Strings window
                                                            Hex View-1
                                                                                                  0
                                                                                      Structures
                                                                                                                 Enums
   1/void _____Fastcall BringUpSSHD(int a1)
  24
  3
      void *hConnection; // r681
  h
      int v2; // r301
  5
      char pcStringOut; // [sp+Ch] [bp-24Ch]01
  6
      BYTE v4[3]: // [sp+Dh] [bp-248h]@1
  7
      char body text; // [sp+40h] [bp-218h]01
  8
  9
      hConnection = a1:
10
      pcStringOut = 0;
11
      sub 80874(04, 0, 49);
12
      sub_92E4(0, "/usr/bin/dropbear", 0, v2);
13
      IP2String(off AE648, &pcStringOut):
14
      sprintf(
 15
       Shody text.
 16
       "<html><body><center><HMRQUEE direction=left SCR0LLDELAY=% SCR0LLAHDUNT=1 TRUESPEED><font face='Conic Sans HS' s
 17
       " color=blue>Bring up ssh server...</font></HARQUEE></center><script>setTimeout('location=\"https://2s\"', 2000)
 18
        "ript>(/body>(/html)".
 19
       SocStringOut);
28
      AddHttpBodyString(hConnection, &body text);
21
      SetHttpNeader(hConnection, 200, "OK", SpcTitle 0, "Expires: 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GHT\r\n", "text/html", 1);
22 }
```



httpd

```
root@kali:~# cat /mnt/etc/ConfigPage/Eng/isshd.htm
<head>
```

```
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=UTF-8" />
```

```
<base target=_top>
```

</head>

<html>

<body> <h3>bring up ssh server done.</h3> </body>

</html>







Bring up ssh server...



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HOP font-size:D(12px; }

</STYLE> 1

2 </HEAD>

<BODY style="FONT-SIZE: 16px; COLOR: #000000; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial', TTER-SPACING: 0.05em">

<table width="760" height="61" border="0" align="center" cellpadding ing="0">

443/tcp open ssl/http

http-title://401/Unauthorized)s_elapsed

ssl-cent: Subject:

Not valid before: 2007-01-12T08:51:32 lease report any incorrect results Not/ valid after: 2008-01-12T08:51:32

2000/tcplopen 1 tcpwrappeds (1 host up) scanned in 57.69 seconds

5060/tcp open Ratcpwrapped seni

8009/tcp open # ssh Dropbear sshd 2013.58 (protocol 2.0)

| ajp-methods: Failed to get a valid response for the OPTION request 1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/ver submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?ne Acronis



Game over

BusyBox v0.60.4 (2013.11.13-02:27+0000) Built-in shell (msh) Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

#






Game...over?

Physical security







There was a database

Card Data List	× +		
	🛈 🔒 https://	/Eng/CardData.htm	🖾 🕁
All Columns	0		Records 1-50 of 1360 rese
: FID	- Card Number	: PNo	: Note
0000	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0001	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0002	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0003	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0004	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0005	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0006	unknown	02 ([L] Forefinger)	
0007	unknown	07 ([R] Forefinger)	
0008	unknown	02 ([L] Forefinger)	
0009	unknown	02 ([L] Forefinger)	
0010	unknown	02 ([L] Forefinger)	
0011	unknown	02 ([L] Forefinger)	
0012	unknown	01 (01 Thumb)	



That secure encryption

```
root@kali:~# grep -A5 Other /mnt/etc/ .ini
[Other]
3Des1 = 12345678
3Des2 =
3Des3 =
DevicePort = 2167
Version =
root@kali:~#
```





And then there were none

I mean, moooore

Same code and artefacts across many devices

find . -name dropbear_rsa_host_key -exec md5sum {} \;
5c2a1f84257a80554653dcf716d772ec

./____/romfs/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key
5c2a1f84257a80554653dcf716d772ec

mnt/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key

5c2a1f84257a80554653dcf716d772ec

mnt/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key

5c2a1f84257a80554653dcf716d772ec

mnt/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key


5c2a1f84257a80554653dcf716d772ec

/romfs/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key



Same code and artefacts across many devices

find . -name ssl_key.pem -exec md5sum {} \;
daa9c2626d07f2f5e4cb901cde1c6556





Same code and artefacts across many devices

find . -type f -name passwd -exec grep -E '^root:' {} \; | sort

root:joGOz07CU4CFU:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh root:joGOz07CU4CFU:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh root:joGOz07CU4CFU:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh root:ps7Rjb6rgzHbs:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh





And then there was Shodan

TOTAL RESULTS

3,455



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What is missing?

RCE

```
g size of received data = recv(sock, g recv buffer, 0x480, (void *)v1);
if ( g size of received data > 0 )
  v3 = strstr(g_recv_buffer, "Host:");
  if ( v3 )
    hname start = v3 + 6;
   hname end = strstr(v_3 + 6, "\r\n"); // 4b0 - 6 - 2 = 4a8
    g hostname len = hname end - hname start; // (0 - n) < 0</pre>
    memncpy(g Host, hname start, hname end - hname start);
  if ( strstr(g recv buffer, "DefaultPage.jpg") )
.data:002200CC g Host
                          .data:002200CC
                                              ; DATA XREF: client exec+130to
.data:002200CC
                                              ; .text:off 260to ...
.data:002200CC
                          .data:002200EC dword 2200EC
                                              ; DATA XREF: sub 78C+8to
                          DCD 0
.data:002200EC
                                              ; sub_78C+10†r ...
     ----
                          ----
```



Acronis

That's it! My thanks to:

Oleg Ishanov Alexander Koshelev Lim Shi Min Lim Qi Kang Ravikant Tiwari

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