



DNS File EXfiltration



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Information:

New HITB Q&A system



- Using “Slido App” to vote best question
- Free swag from HITB (yay!)
- Interactive, ask question anytime (answer maybe later)
- Don't worry, go ahead and put your question out!
- Extra swag from me too (笑)

Hello, Friend



- My name is Emilio or エミリオ and I'm hacker
- I like to play with packets, networks, electronics and 3D printers
- I presented tools at various conferences (DEF CON, BlackHat Asia, HITB, AV Tokyo, SECCON, HamaSec, Hacker's Party, etc)
- Sorry, I'm not a native programmer or English speaker ☺

DNS File EXfiltration?



What?

- Using DNS protocol as a “Covert Channel”
- Unauthorized Files Transfer (in a polite way)

When?

- A post-exploitation technique
- Used in restricted networks (NG Firewalls, IPS, Proxies)


How?

- The good old fashion “HIPS” (Hide In Plain Sight)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covert_channel

<https://dfex.dob.jp>

DNS traffic



Existing Tools



DNS Exfiltration

- *dnsteal* v2.0
<https://github.com/m57/dnsteal>
- *DNSExfiltrator*
<https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator>
- *dns-exfiltration*
<https://github.com/krmawell/dns-exfiltration>
- *dns_exfiltration*
https://github.com/coryschwartz/dns_exfiltration
- *Requestbin*
<http://requestbin.net/dns>

DNS Tunneling

- <https://dnstunnel.de/>
- <https://code.kryo.se/iodine/>
- <https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2>



Tools look like this

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What we wish

- AES 256-CTR Encryption
- Retransmission Capabilities
- Error free (CRC)
- Threading Support
- Speed? (back to 4800 bauds!)
- Multiple sub/domain (avoid IOC)
- Stealthy
- One-way packets*



Tools we want

* Unless retransmission

Avoiding Detection



Things we don't want:

- Short DNS TTL
- DNS TXT records
- Long DNS FQDN queries
- High volume requests from same IP
- Same sub/domain



Things we do want:

- Control vs Data sub/domains
- DNS NS query type
- No answer from data domains
- Multiple sub/domains for control and data
- Limit name request to 20-30 char



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DFEX Algorithm



Steps:

- 1) File CRC32
- 2) File ID generation
- 3) Compress file (zlib)
- 4) Generate key (hashed passphrase)
- 5) Encrypt file with AES-256 CTR
- 6) Apply base32 with custom padding
- 7) Split file into 20-30 characters chunks
- 8) Generate SRC IP's list for spoofing
- 9) Send control DNS packet (ID, CRC32, total pkts)
- 10) Send data DNS packet (ID, pkt seq, 20-30 char)
- 11) Repeat 10) till completed
- 12) Send control re-transmission packet
- 13) If DNS 'A' answer, re-send data seq X pkt
- 14) Send control re-transmission packet
- 15) Holdtime expired and file transfer completed




<https://dfex.dob.jp>

Are these queries suspicious?



d15d5hi91tsj9x.cloudfront.net

efa2f1adkf9fjdncu8dbsowd5f.cloudwatch.net



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Well....



```
tango~$ nslookup d15d5hi91tsj9x.cloudfront.net  
Server: 8.8.8.8  
Address: 8.8.8.8#53
```

```
Non-authoritative answer:  
Name: d15d5hi91tsj9x.cloudfront.net  
Address: 13.249.146.100  
Name: d15d5hi91tsj9x.cloudfront.net  
Address: 13.249.146.31  
Name: d15d5hi91tsj9x.cloudfront.net  
Address: 13.249.146.18  
Name: d15d5hi91tsj9x.cloudfront.net  
Address: 13.249.146.13
```

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However.....



```
tango~$ nslookup efa2f1adkf9fdncu8db Dowd5f.cloudwatch.net
```

```
Server: 8.8.8.8
```

```
Address: 8.8.8.8#53
```

```
** server can't find efa2f1adkf9fdncu8db Dowd5f.cloudwatch.net: NXDOMAIN
```

Diagram: Control Flow



DFEX Client




10.10.10.40

Internal DNS Server



10.10.10.1



DFEX Server




dns.ctl.dom
200.200.200.1

IPTables drop
outbound ICMP
reply packets

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Diagram: Data Flow



DFEX Client



10.10.10.40

1 DNS NS Query for
<ID+SEQ+CHUNK>.(dat).dom
SRC IP: 10.10.10.<XXX>

3 Retransmission?
DNS A Query for
<ID+0000>.ctl.dom
SRC IP: 10.10.10.40

6 DNS A Answer:
200.239.123.8 (cached)

7 DNS NS Query for
<ID+07b8+CHUNK>.(dat).dom
SRC IP: 10.10.10.<XXX>

Internal DNS Server



10.10.10.1

2 DNS NS Query for
<ID+SEQ+CHUNK>.(dat).dom
n+1

4 DNS A Query for
<ID+0000>.ctl.dom

8 DNS NS Query for
<ID+07b8+CHUNK>.(dat).dom

NG Firewall
allow "DNS" from
Internal DNS only



Yes, missing pkt 07b8

DFEX Server




dat.com / ctl.dom
200.200.200.1


*IPTables drop
outbound ICMP
reply packets*

5 DNS A Answer:
SEED.ID.SEQ.SEQ
(200.239.123.8)

Packet Example



Demo Infra (MACCHERONI)



Proof of Concept or go away



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Performance



Example:

- 120Kb file
- ~1900 packets (20 Characters)
- Source network (/24)
- 5 Data Domains
- 1 Control Domain

Results:

- ~270 seconds
- 1-2 query per IP for Data Domain
- 1 query (total) for Control Domain
- 4.8kbps file transfer speed



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
Limitations



- Up to 255 simultaneous files
- ~4Mb file size
- Retransmission TTL (caching)

The Future

- DDFEX – Distributed DNS File EXfiltration
- Cloud Automation
- C&C Manager



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Conclusion



Prevention & Detection:

- Don't allow DNS external query 😊
- Use DNS Sinkhole
- DNS log analytics (ie, Splunk) and smart SOC people
- Entropy analytics methods using same smart SOC people
- DNS Cloud Services (ie, Umbrella/CloudFlare)



Questions?

Before I forget...

Disclaimer:



The tool is provided for educational, research or testing purposes
Using this tool against network/systems without prior permission is
illegal

The author is not liable for any damages from misuse of this tool,
techniques or code



Thanks!



Emilio



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<https://github.com/ekiojp/dfex>



<https://dfex.dob.jp>